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SOME RELIGIOUSLY DEVOUT JUSTICES,
CIVIL RELIGION, AND THE CULTURE
WAR
CHRISTOPHER F. WOLFE*
Thomas Berg and William Ross provide us with some thoughtful
discussion of religious Supreme Court judges and American law. Most
of what I say will simply reinforce or extend their arguments, but I will
note a few differences between us.
I. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND CIVIL RELIGION
The first two parts of the paper (on justices in the Gilded Age and in
the New Deal) could be described as an essay on civil religion and some
Supreme Court justices. There was, as they note, in the earlier eras of
American history, a "de facto Protestant establishment,"' in which the
planting of the colonies and the birth and development of the nation
were seen as unfolding under the hand of Divine Providence. I suspect
that members of the Supreme Court during this era generally tended to
reflect the more elite brand of religious views, which tended toward
Unitarianism rather than Calvinism. But, in either case, the harmony
between religion and American political ideals was felt to be strong.
This initial sense of harmony was reflected in the writing of Gilded Age
justices such as William Strong, Joseph Bradley, John Harlan, and
David Brewer. I find persuasive the suggestion of Berg and Ross that,
while there are explicit religious references at this time, they are rela-
tively few, because "Christian morality (or a version of it) may have so
pervaded legal doctrines in a general way that, paradoxically, explicit
references were seldom needed."' The key, of course, is that "the main-
stream Protestantism of this period was highly non-doctrinal, instrumen-
* Professor of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Ph.D.,
Boston College, 1978; B.A., summa cum laude, Notre Dame, 1971.
1. Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices: Historical
Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 383 (1998).
2. It might be interesting to start a paper like this closer to the beginning of American
history, by examining some of the religious views of earlier Court justices, such as John Jay
and Joseph Story.
3. Berg & Ross, supra, note 1, at 391.
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tal, and general," which made it easy to blend Christianity and Ameri-
can constitutional ideals. It was not necessary to "draw sharp lines be-
tween the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, Holy Scrip-
ture, and The Wealth of Nations. '
The same is true with the New Deal Justice Frank Murphy, who was
Roman Catholic (though somewhat anticlerical). Murphy "repeatedly
defended New Deal-style regulation as the application of Christian prin-
ciples of charity to the new social and industrial order," even citing a
specific encyclical (Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum) as providing the basis
of his labor views.6 On the Court, he saw himself as "an evangelist for
broad principles of freedom and equality"7 and "for Murphy, as for the
Gilded Age justices of the Protestant establishment, Christian values
were not just consistent with, but identical to, constitutional ideals of
democracy and equality."'
But, of course, this "equating... of Christianity, of morality, and of
constitutional ideals" also raises some interesting questions, especially in
light of the post-Everson dispensation of American church-state rela-
tions. Isn't civil religion a "religion"? And, if so, isn't it true of civil re-
ligion, as it is of other religions, that it cannot be "established"? Under
the dominant earlier, pre-Everson9 notions of church-state principles,
which I take to be nonpreferentialism,o it was possible to uphold a gen-
eral (rather non-doctrinal) theism (which favored religion in general,
without singling out particular sects for special preferences) without
violating the Establishment Clause. But in the post-Everson era, when
favoring religion in general has become a constitutional violation, how
can civil religion be exempted from the separationist principle? Perhaps
that fact, more than anything else, suggests why Murphy refrained from
including any explicit religious references in his opinions. On the other
hand, I do not think that Berg and Ross are incorrect in pointing to two
other important factors: (1) "increasing religious diversity in America"
and (2) the fact that "intellectual and professional elites had come to
4. Id. at 394.
5. Id., (quoting Owen M. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in P. BERGAN
ET AL., THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 53, 63 (1986)).
6. Berg & Ross, supra note 1, at 395.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 399.
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. See generally GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN
AMERICA (Greenwood Press, 1987).
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think that religious arguments lacked any credibility."11 But these two
factors may explain the absence of religious Court opinions more indi-
rectly, in the sense that they help to explain why Everson adopted a
view of church-state relations so strikingly at odds with American his-
tory (including such aspects as the Declaration of Independence, "In
God We Trust" on coins, congressional chaplains, Presidential procla-
mations of prayer and thanksgiving, and so forth).
The apparent power of the civil religion-the tendency to assimilate
religious and constitutional ideals, on the terms of the latter-in Mur-
phy's own thinking raises interesting questions. Murphy was a Roman
Catholic, but there are suggestions in the Berg and Ross paper that he
may have been more an "American Catholic." In defending Jehovah's
Witnesses parents' right to have their children pass out religious tracts
(against the application of child labor laws), Murphy emphasizes paren-
tal rights in religious education in a note to his law clerk, but adds,
apologetically, that this "might sound a little Catholic but I assure you I
have nothing in mind but liberty of religion in a country that was con-
ceived as a sanctuary for oppressed people., 12 Why so apologetic about
sounding Catholic? And why endorse parental religious education
rights for Jehovah's Witnesses, but then join strict separationist opinions
(in the education area) in such cases as Everson and McCollum? 3 Is this
the embarrassment of so many modern Catholic intellectuals that they
might be accused of being sectarian Catholics?
Berg and Ross make an observation in this section of their paper
that could open the door to a much wider discussion of religion and Su-
preme Court justices. Murphy's separationism is linked with similar
views of Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter, and Berg and Ross
are explicit in attributing very definite religious views to these justices.
Black and Douglas are "sympathetic to individual conscience but suspi-
cious of the social power of communal or organized religion"14 and
Frankfurter-out of a concern for secular social unity-is even more un-
sympathetic to religious claims. These remarks suggest that justices'
"religious views" go far beyond identification with a particular religion.
They suggest-rightly-that modem separationism may often reflect an
11. Berg & Ross, supra note 1, at 399.
12. Id. at 395.
13. McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Of course, the bottom line in
Everson was not so separationist, but the broad discussion of the principles of the First
Amendment that preceded the holding was-and it helped lead to the more separationist re-
sult in McCollum.
14. Berg and Ross, supra note 1, at 396-97.
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underlying hostility to certain forms of religion: not merely religions
that are intolerant in the sense of the post-Reformation religious war-
fare (for few would object to the disfavoring of religions that would
violate the rights of other religious believers), but also religions that are
not willing to be confined to the purely private sphere.
Also interesting in this regard, especially given that Berg and Ross
chose Murphy, a Roman Catholic, as a subject of attention, would be a
look at Justice William Brennan. Brennan made significant contribu-
tions to the strong separationist wing of the Court (as his major concur-
rence in Abington School District v. Schempp5 and his later Court
opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard'6 demonstrated) in church-state cases.
Perhaps even more notably, he was a major supporter of modem
"autonomist" positions in modem "culture-war cases," such as Roe v.
Wade,17 and Bowers v. Hardwick,8 despite the strong opposition of his
Church to such positions.
One of the most interesting examples of Brennan's jurisprudential
opposition to the moral views of the Catholic faith is his opinion in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,9 in which Brennan penned the following statement:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an in-
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an asso-
ciation of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.20
Quite apart from the fact that Brennan says nothing about contra-
ception that might in any way reflect the teaching of Catholicism, the
view of marriage here is dramatically individualistic. 2' The overtones of
15. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
16. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see BOB WOODWARD & ScoTt ARMSTRONG, THE BRE-
THEREN (1979). The account of Roe v. Wade in The Brethren-whatever the other limita-
tions of that book-seems entirely credible, and it assigns a significant role in the develop-
ment of the Court majority to Brennan's behind-the-scenes work.
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Id. at 453.
21. Note also, in this regard, Justice Brennan's joining of the Court opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Danforth court dis-
misses the participation of the father in the abortion decision, not even treating the father as
[Vol. 81:427
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Brennan's description of marriage do not immediately resonate with a
conception of marriage in which the "two shall become one flesh."'
IX. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND TODAY'S CULTURE WAR
Berg and Ross are right to see the issue of religion and the Court to-
day as a reflection of today's culture war between "traditionalists" and
those with "progressive" views, "in areas such as education, the family,
and sexuality.' 3 Unlike the past, today's more publicly religious justices
(e.g., Scalia and Thomas, who have spoken explicitly about their per-
sonal-and generally traditional-religious views in off-the-court
speeches) are less likely to identify their religious views and constitu-
tional ideals. In fact, their commitment to some form of originalism
seems to create a deep separation between their religious views and
their judicial decisionmaking.
Berg and Ross make the observation that, despite their commitment
to limited judicial power, Scalia and Thomas have still been able to
reach "constitutional results that, so far as we can tell, are consistent
with the views of traditionalist Christianity."
24 How?2
Berg and Ross point out three ways in which Scalia's and Thomas'
interpretive approaches harmonize with traditionalist culture war views.
First, their interpretive approach allows one's personal religious beliefs
to enter into the determination of social or "constitutional facts" ("one's
application of the law to particular facts"); Romer is a prime example,
with regard to whether the Second Amendment was based on irrational
animus against a class of people or on moral disapproval of homosexual
conduct. Second, tradition is a key element in their interpretive ap-
proach, and this permits religious views to become significant factors in
having an independent interest in the child, but regarding paternal participation as an attempt
by the state to delegate whatever power it might have to the father.
22. Matthew 19:5.
23. Berg & Ross, supra note 1, at 401.
24. Id. at 403.
25. Berg and Ross mention, but for the most part set aside, the possibility that Scalia
and Thomas are acting hypocritically. The one area where they give credence to the charge
of hypocrisy (although they say that extensive discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's
original meaning would be necessary to make it stick) is affirmative action, "where they use
rather free-floating language about the immorality and counterproductivity of race-conscious
programs." It is hard for me to see how the charge of hypocrisy is any more plausible here,
since their positions are based squarely on their plain reading of the central principle of the
equal protection clause as a denial of the legitimacy of race-based differential treatment of
citizens. They may be wrong in this interpretation, but it is hard for me to see any reason to
doubt their sincerity. Id at 404 n.92.
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interpretation, as in Bowers v. Hardwick (or, without any explicit relig-
ious reference, Cruzan).26 Third, Scalia and Thomas emphasize that
their interpretive approach entails deference to the political branches.
Even though some of the practical political results of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith27 may be unpalatable to Scalia, his position is that the leg-
islature is the arena in which these issues should be decided.
After some discussion, Berg and Ross seem to indicate that, for the
most part, the limited sources approach insulates Scalia from the charge
that, by upholding laws that permit or mandate immorality, he acts im-
morally. The exception they mention is that a judge may be viewed as
materially cooperating in evil, unjustifiably, (a) when he "makes state-
ments in the course of upholding a law that give the impression that the
law is moral when it is not"'; and (b) when "moral factors can and
should play a role in constitutional interpretation when the 'limited
sources' of text and tradition cannot give definitive answers in particular
cases."
29
The first case ("a"), in which a judge says that a law is moral when it
is not, is not so much a case of material cooperation in the wrong act
being done in the particular case, perhaps, as simply a case of saying
something that is objectively false (with culpability being determined by
whether this error is intentional, or even if not intentional, if it rests on a
failure to know what one has a responsibility to know, e.g., the teaching
of the Church).
Berg and Ross' second case ("b") is based on a failure to understand
the implications of a "limited sources" position, or at least Scalia's ver-
sion of it. Here I think Berg and Ross concede too much to contempo-
rary notions of judicial review as an essentially discretionary power.
Scalia would argue, I think, that if "text and tradition cannot give defini-
tive answers in particular cases"' , then it is the duty of the judge to de-
fer to the legislature. His limited sources approach does not say that a
justice is bound by text and tradition if they give a definite answer, but
he is free to decide the case on his own best judgment if they do not give
a definite answer. Judges are bound by text and tradition, Scalia would
say, and if a law is not unconstitutional on the basis of text and tradition,
then there is no ground for a justice to exercise judicial review.
26. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28. Berg and Ross, sup'a note 1, at 411.
29. Berg and Ross, supra note 1, at 411.
30. Id.
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Berg and Ross seem to believe that Scalia's position in death penalty
cases is questionable, while his stated willingness to uphold laws permit-
ting abortion and euthanasia is not. While I ultimately agree that a tra-
ditionalist justice ought not to strike down laws allowing abortion and
euthanasia, the matter is a bit more complicated than it might appear at
first. Some pro-life advocates, for example, have made the following
case about abortion.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains a clause which says that states
may not deny to persons under their jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law. It is a simple fact, rooted in human biology, that human life be-
gins at conception-and, frankly, outside the context of abortion (say, in
the field of neonatology, with its wonderful developments that make
possible medical care of the unborn while they are still in the womb) I
think this biological fact is a widely, though perhaps only implicitly, ac-
cepted "social fact." (What couple happy to have conceived a child con-
siders the being in the womb merely "a blob of cells"-unless perhaps
they make a strenuous effort to bring their natural sense of things in line
with ideological opinions on abortion?) Nor, despite efforts made to
show the contrary, is there any persuasive argument that human per-
sonhood can somehow be separated from human life.31 Liberal abortion
laws clearly deny unborn children the equal protection of ordinary laws
prohibiting the use of private lethal force against innocent persons.
Therefore liberal abortion laws deny the equal protection of the laws
and are unconstitutional. (Note the obvious fact that there is no appeal
to religious beliefs of any sort in this line of reasoning.)
This is a controversial claim, of course. But its constitutional logic is
far greater than that of Roe v. Wade32 and its progeny. It easily meets
whatever standards one might put forward for making a "colorable"
claim. For reasons that I have discussed elsewhere, I think there are
sound reasons for judges not to strike down such laws, despite their pro-
found immorality.3 Judicial review ought not to be exercised on the ba-
sis of merely colorable claims, or indeed on the basis of anything less
than a clear constitutional command, 34 and I do not believe that the in-
31. See Robert George, Public Reason and Political Conflict Abortion and Homosexu-
ality 106 YALE LJ. 2475, at 2491-2495 (1997).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Natural Law and Judicial Review, in NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC
POLICY (David Forte ed., Georgetown University Press).
34. This proposition is discussed and analyzed at length in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE
RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEW (rev. ed. 1995). See also CHRISTOPHER WOLFE,
JUDICIAL ACrviSM (rev. ed. 1997), and CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, How TO READ THE
1998]
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clusion of unborn children in the Fourteenth Amendment is a clear con-
stitutional command. The fact that other justices-such as the authors
of the Roe and Casey35 opinions-have grossly abused their judicial
power to further immoral legislation is no warrant for other justices to
strike down immoral laws by abusing their powers.
The foregoing argument leads me to make a point that may get lost
in Berg and Ross's observation that Scalia and Thomas's interpretive
approach is "consistent" with traditionalist culture war views. I think it
is important to note the price that traditionalists pay by sticking to their
interpretive views.
There is a profound asymmetry in the Court's cases dealing with cul-
ture war issues (education, the family, and sexuality). Liberal justices in
general put forward views that embrace a particular vision within the
culture war, namely the "autonomist" view, which would leave to pri-
vate individuals the power to make decisions in such matters, without
being subject to regulation by government in the name of the common
good. For example, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick
makes a case for private power to decide issues relating to "personal in-
timacy." But there is no "conservative" culture war position repre-
sented in Supreme Court opinions. Justice White's Court opinion in
Bowers says absolutely nothing about sodomy, other than that the peo-
ple of Georgia can prohibit it if they want to, largely because Americans
in the past have never felt it was a right. Likewise, Blackmun's Court
opinion in Roe v. Wade and the plurality opinion in Casey reaffirming
the "central holding" of Roe make an argument for a women's right to
choose to have an abortion, while the dissents in those cases simply
point out that the Constitution does not authorize the Court to strike
down abortion-limiting legislation, since it leaves that whole matter to
the states. There has never been a Court opinion that attempts to ex-
plain why abortion or homosexuality is wrong.
Now it may be true, if Scalia is right, that judges have no reason to
discuss why abortion or homosexuality is wrong, since the Constitution
says nothing on either subject. But that does not remove a very genuine
and severe problem: the advantage that liberals in the culture war derive
from the educative impact of Supreme Court opinions. Supreme Court
opinions are important not only because they are decisions of a case, but
also because-whether justices see this as part of their "duty" or not-
they help to shape opinions in this nation. The Court is one of the main
CONSTITUTION (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
35. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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instruments for shaping the "public philosophy" of the United States,
precisely for one of the reasons that is often put forward
(unpersuasively, in my opinion) to justify judicial activism: it is unusual
in the degree to which its duties require it to give reasoned opinions on
questions raised about our fundamental law. These opinions must be
studied by a whole class of people who are, or will be, among the most
important shapers of American political life and public opinion (lawyers
and law students). For cultural conservatives to engage in that debate,
with their views on the substantive issues at stake muffled, is to put
them at a great disadvantage.
I do not know that there is any easy way to handle this asymmetry.
But one, rather limited suggestion is this: if Scalia and Thomas are loath
to explicitly adopt a stance on culture war issues in their opinions, in
their capacity as judges, might they not be able at least to lay out the po-
sitions that will otherwise be ignored by the simple expedient of repre-
senting them as third-party opinions? Such opinions could take some-
thing like this form:
Justice So-and-So, arguing for the Court [or in dissent], main-
tains that there is a constitutional right to [abortion, or assisted-
suicide, gay marriage, etc.] on the grounds that [whatever version
of liberal autonomy has been presented in the case]. It does not
appear, however, that the Constitution takes any particular stand
on this issue. What are we judges to say, then, to those who ar-
gue, contrary to Justice So-and-So, that public policy ought to be
determined by quite different considerations. For example, [here
state a trenchant case for a moral traditionalist public policy].
Don't people with these views have just as much a right, under
the Constitution, to shape our public policy, through the legisla-
tive process? We are compelled to acknowledge that, in the ab-
sence of any constitutional command to the contrary, the deter-
mination of such issues is left, not to this or any other court, but
to the ordinary political process.
Of course, this might lead to criticism of Scalia and Thomas, on the
grounds that it is their own policy views-now explicitly revealed in the
description of the moral traditionalist position-that is the real engine
of their opinions, rather than their conception of the Constitution. But
how would that differ from the present situation, in which their critics
hardly seem reluctant to accuse them of hiding their political opinions
behind disingenuous judicial reasoning?
In making this argument, I am implicitly distinguishing between a
judicial activism that consists in judicial specification of allegedly vague
constitutional generalities (which is characteristic of modern judicial ac-
19981
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tivism), and a narrower and more defensible judicial activism that con-
sists in a judicial defense of the Constitution. Chief Justice John Mar-
shall was, in my opinion, an example of the latter, in that he wrote broad
opinions-often broader than were necessary to decide a case-with a
view to defending the Constitution against those who would undermine
it.' I believe that Scalia and Thomas would be equally justified in writ-
ing broader opinions to defend the legitimate authority of the political
branches to legislate on the basis of traditionalist moral views, and to
minimize the unfair advantage that "autonomists" derive from the cur-
rent shape of judicial opinions.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The point on which Berg and Ross seem more willing to raise serious
questions about the fidelity of Scalia (and perhaps Thomas) to their re-
ligious ideals concerns the death penalty. They argue that Scalia may
have gone beyond merely upholding the constitutionality of the death
penalty to active support for it, in two ways. First, Scalia has "rejected
claims by capital defendants in situations where moral arguments
against the death penalty could permissibly enter into constitutional in-
terpretation."3 7 But, as I suggested above , Scalia would probably deny
that such moral arguments could legitimately enter into constitutional
interpretation. If text and tradition leave the matter unclear, that is no
warrant for judicial decisionmaking, but rather a ground for judges to
defer to the political branches. Second, they "wonder if Justice Scalia
has not sometimes left the distinct impression that the death penalty is
morally justified, and not merely within the people's power to enact."' 9
But here (as in the first point as well), Berg and Ross assume-despite
earlier qualifications 4° -that there is some kind of obligation to oppose
the death penalty. They do not consider whether Scalia might have in
mind those cases in which the death penalty is legitimate (or at least
cases that fall within the range of legitimate free opinion among Catho-
lics).
Pope John Paul II, in Evangelium Vitae, states that "punishment...
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity; in other words, when it would not be possible other-
36. See WOLFE, supra note 34, at 84-89
37. Berg and Ross, supra note 1 at 413.
38. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
39. Berg and Ross, supra note 1, at 413.
40. Berg and Ross, supra note 1 at 412 n.116.
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wise to defend society. Today however, as a result of steady improve-
ments in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare,
if not practically non-existent."'" And, citing the Catechism of the
Catholic Church, he goes on to say: "If bloodless means are sufficient to
defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and
the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means,
because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the com-
mon good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human per-
son."
42
These are strong statements, and I do not wish to suggest that they
are not quite serious. But, at the same time, I think that the limits of the
statements ought to be noted as well. (Berg and Ross rightly note that
this is not a teaching on the per se immorality of capital punishment,
though they do "doubt that the current practice of capital punishment in
America comports with any reasonable reading of the papal state-
ments." 43)
It is often useful to reformulate a principle to recognize its implica-
tions more fully. So, for example, the first sentence above might fairly
be restated in this way: "In (the very rare) cases of absolute necessity-
when it is not possible otherwise to defend society-and only in those,
punishment ought to go to the extreme of executing an offender." That
is, the teaching of the Pope is that the death penalty in some cases is ap-
propriate. This puts the matter in a category quite distinct from actions
that are intrinsically wrong, such as directly-procured abortion or sui-
cide.
As to the authority of the discussion of the death penalty, it is neces-
sary to note the distinction between different kinds of statements in pa-
pal teaching. In particular, one must distinguish between principles and
more particularized prudential judgments. Vatican II's Dogmatic Con-
stitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, says that "religious submis-
sion of the mind and will must be given in a unique way to the authorita-
tive teaching of the Roman Pontiff, even when he does not speak ex
cathedra. That is, it must be given in such a way that his supreme magis-
terium is reverently acknowledged, and the judgments proposed by him
are sincerely accepted, according to his manifest mind and will, which he
expresses chiefly either by the type of document, or by the frequent
41. JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE (EVANGELIUM VITAE) 91 (Pauline Books &
Media, 1995).
42. Id. at 92.
43. Berg & Ross, supra note 1, at 412 n.117.
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proposal of the same teaching, or by the argument for the position.""
Now, in light of these distinctions, contrast the way the pope speaks,
in Evangelium Vitae, of abortion and euthanasia, on one hand, and the
death penalty, on the other. The condemnations of abortion and eutha-
nasia are very strong (even solemn) and unqualified. The discussion of
the death penalty is neither solemn nor unqualified.
Moreover, in according weight to the discussion of the death penalty
in Evangelium Vitae, one must also note the recent vintage of this
teaching, contrasted with almost two millennia in which the morality of
the death penalty was upheld. It is plainly arguable that there is going
on here a process of "development" of doctrine on this matter, as, for
example, earlier eras saw a development of doctrine on slavery and cer-
tain aspects of religious liberty. But it is clearly the case that we do not
have here an authoritative Church teaching that the death penalty is
wrong, and there is no attempt in Church teaching (as, in my opinion, is
appropriate45) to be specific about what the "very rare" cases are that
would justify the death penalty.
An evaluation of Scalia's death penalty jurisprudence, then, is com-
plex. First, Scalia can, acting in accord with Catholic teaching, go so far
as to "formally cooperate" (uphold a death penalty, intending to bring
about the result of death) in some cases, namely, those-unspecified-
"rare" cases in which the death penalty is legitimate. Second, in those
cases where the death penalty is not justified by Catholic teaching,
Scalia's upholding of death penalties can be justified by his "limited
sources" approach to constitutional adjudication. It is even question-
able whether this is a form of "material cooperation." For a judge to
say-truthfully-that he has no jurisdiction to overrule a state act in a
particular case is not "cooperation" in the act itself. But even if it is co-
operation, it is legitimate, as long as his "cooperation in evil" is not for-
mal cooperation (intending the evil itself), but only justifiable material
cooperation (accepting the evil as a byproduct of another action which is
good-in this case, performing his judicial function of interpreting and
applying the law, according to the intention of the lawgiver, whatever
that may be). Third, even apart from the legitimacy of the previous two
cases based on the teaching of John Paul II and the Catholic Catechism,
44. Lumen Gentium (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World), in
VATICAN COUNCIL II: CONSTITUTIONS, DECREES, DECLARATIONS 163-282 (1996).
45. To be clear, I should indicate that it is the teaching of the Catholic Church that the
Church hierarchy has the legitimate authority to make such specific judgments (see, for ex-
ample, the statement to that effect in the encyclical Mater et Magistra); but only very rarely
does the Church exercise such power (and wisely so, in my opinion).
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there is the possibility that Scalia may, in good faith, question the
authoritativeness of the prudential part of this relatively recent and
somewhat qualified teaching, namely, whether and to what extent the
legitimate use of the death penalty would be "rare." That is a very fact-
bound judgment involving complex determinations about the magnitude
of crime and the relative merits of different ways of dealing with it. As
such, it does not carry the same weight or authority as the general
moral principles enunciated in the ordinary Magisterium.
In light of those observations, I do not see any reasonable grounds
for saying that Justice Scalia is not a good Catholic because of his death
penalty decisions or his failure to recuse himself in such cases. That is
true both (a) because he himself, as a Catholic, has a legitimate range of
free opinion on the subject, and also (b) because he must acknowledge
that others-the political branches-have such a range of free opinion.
The second point is particularly important, given his interpretive princi-
ples and the fact that the Constitution is not merely silent on this issue,
as it is on many other controversial issues, but clearly implies the legiti-
macy of the death penalty (in the due process and double jeopardy
clauses).
IV. CONCLUSION
If I were to fault Justice Scalia for anything in his jurisprudence, it
would be for his failure to distinguish more carefully what might be
called his "judicial positivism" from a broader "legal positivism." So
concerned does he appear to be with denying judicial discretion unteth-
ered to the positive law-a completely defensible position for a moral
traditionalist-that the language he uses at times suggests a much
broader (and completely indefensible) positivism, i.e., that what the
majority does is right because the majority does it. I do not believe that
this is Justice Scalia's position, but perhaps he should give more atten-
tion to the fact that many people appear to believe that it is.
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